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ABSTRACT

Current levels of federal and state support to increase access to higher education and the barriers now being faced are considered, based on a Higher Education Research Institute report. The postwar transition from elite to mass to universal higher education has been accompanied by major changes in government support. State governments have supported the growth and expansion of public postsecondary systems, while federal policy has focused on removing the financial and nonfinancial barriers to college access and degree attainment. It is suggested that major federal categorical programs designed to assist minority students and minority institutions have generally had positive impacts and benefits, including improved access. However, the issue of choice is not fully resolved. Special programs for access and persistence do improve access and retention, but they fall short of their stated goal of improving academic performance, and institutional aid remains controversial. The challenges of the 1980s will be for state, federal, local, and institutional officials to cooperate in developing better programs that promote participation for minorities. Attention is also directed to Title III of the Higher Education Act of 1965 and the Reagan Administration's funding cuts for education. An extensive bibliography is included. (SW)

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Government Support for Minority Participation in Higher Education

Kenneth C. Green



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Government Support for Minority Participation In Higher Education

Kenneth C. Green

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

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Foreword

Discrimination in the admission of college students because of an individual's race, creed, color, sex, national origin or ancestry is an antidemocratic practice which creates serious inequalities in the opportunity for higher education. The Commission is opposed to discrimination and believes that it should be abandoned (President's Commission 1947, v. 2, p. 25).

We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of "separate but equal" has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the plaintiff's and other similar situated for whom the actions have been brought are, by reason of segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment (Brown versus Board of Education 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).

The Truman Commission Report and the *Brown* decision clearly established the social goal of promoting equal educational opportunity; however, the means to achieve this goal as well as conditions affecting it varied widely. While the civil rights movement of the 1960's created a more positive public attitude, today's financial problems at both institutional and government levels have created new concerns about the promotion of access and choice for minority students.

Because the U.S. Constitution leaves the responsibility for education to the states, the federal government has resorted to a carrot-stick approach. With the creation of the need-based student aid programs, coupled with federal regulations prohibiting minority discrimination, the federal government has been able to dramatically increase minority participation.* However, as the nation faces a $2 billion deficit in FY 1983, the ability of the federal government to continue its level of commitment is threatened.

State commitment to equal educational opportunity has come in several forms: offering education with low or no tuition; increasing student financial aid levels; and providing additional support programs for students needing further academic preparation. State institutions have been able to steadily and significantly increase minority participation. However, state revenues have fallen in the economic recession of the early 1980s, at the same time that states have had to assume more responsibility for existing social programs. As a result of these factors, in addition to rising educational costs, many states are being forced to reexamine the tuition structure and curriculum offerings of their institutions.

The current trend has been to increase tuition and cutback or discontinue basic education programs. The former step is an effort to increase

*The progress was examined in the AAHE-ERIC Higher Education Research Report by Larry L. Leslie, *Higher Education Opportunity: A Decade of Progress*. Report No. 3, 1977.

revenues. The latter aims to cut costs. It is based on the philosophical position that only students of high academic achievement should be eligible to attend higher education institutions, that it is not the responsibility of academe to provide educational programs that should have been obtained at the elementary/secondary level. This position argues that in order to maintain a quality higher education system, only students of a certain level of proven academic standing should be admitted and therefore remedial or other special counseling services are unnecessary. Cutting out these programs obviously decreases institutional expenses.

These conditions threaten minority students' access and their ability to succeed in higher education. The questions that need to be faced by higher education institutions include: How far have we come in promoting equal educational opportunity? Are the new barriers to equal educational opportunity so great that further improvements will not be made? In what ways can the states and their institutions continue to promote equal educational opportunity and still maintain a financially viable education system?

In this report, Kenneth C. Green, research associate at the Higher Education Research Institute, University of California, Los Angeles, reviews current levels of federal and state support for educational opportunity and the barriers now being faced. This Research Report is based on a report prepared by the Higher Education Research Institute for the Commission on the Higher Education of Minorities and was funded by the Ford Foundation. Green's review provides a firm foundation for an institution to review its present and future efforts to promote participation by minorities in higher education.

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Overview

Since 1965, blacks, American Indians, and later Mexican-Americans and Puerto Ricans have been the implicit if not specific beneficiaries of a range of federal and state programs intended to promote participation by minorities in higher education. This report reviews the goals and substance of government efforts to aid and assist minorities in American higher education. It examines the extent to which government efforts—largely government policies and categorical programs—have promoted participation in and attainment of higher education.

The transition from elite to mass to universal higher education in the United States in the years following World War II is a direct result of an expanded governmental presence in higher education. This transition has been marked by major shifts in government's role in higher education, particularly at the federal level. The federal government has evolved from a consumer of educational goods and services to an underwriter of access as a vehicle to larger policy goals. Similarly, the evolution and expansion of public higher education since 1945 has dramatically changed the state role, forcing the states to think in terms of public systems of higher education instead of individual (and often unrelated) public colleges and universities.

Because the Constitution designated education as the responsibility of the states and not the federal government, federal forays into educational policy were generally linked to policy objectives in other areas, such as land settlement (the Morrill Act) or national defense (the National Defense Education Act). Individual states indentified and implemented higher education policy as they saw fit, often with little concern for the issues of equality and equity that are currently a major concern of higher education policy makers and government officials.

Beginning in the 1960s, however, federal policy makers began to develop a new conceptual framework for the government's role in higher education. Education became an important policy priority as part of the larger federal effort to expand employment opportunities and promote equality. The link between education and economic opportunity initially established by Lyndon Johnson's Great Society programs subsequently established the federal government as a major benefactor of both colleges and college students. Minority groups in particular were often the intended if not the explicit beneficiaries of these new government programs.

Federal legislation funding categorical programs has tended to overshadow the traditional state role in and responsibility for higher education. The states traditionally supported "brick and mortar" approaches to higher education, funding new campuses and programs often without regard for larger issues of access and equity. Although the states contribute more to the continuing operation of postsecondary education, the federal government has "assumed major responsibility for the educational equity issues often overlooked by state and local governments" (Commission on the Higher Education of Minorities 1982, p. 39). Despite some bitter battles between state and federal policy makers over issues of equity (e.g., the *Adams* case), state policy makers have shown growing concern in recent

years for issues of participation by minorities. In some states, such as California and New York, state-funded categorical programs often parallel the extensive array of existing federal programs, providing additional millions for financial aid and support services. In other states, however, appropriations for access support programs are but a small fraction of the federal funds annually allocated to public colleges in the state.

The underlying conceptual basis for federal and state higher education policy rests on the link between education and economic opportunity. Higher education has become the chosen vehicle for domestic social policy: increased educational attainment and greater participation by minorities, leading to increased participation by minorities in the American occupational structure and the mainstream of American life. Roughly 15 years into the great social and educational experiment that gave birth and direction to government programs, we confront a seemingly simple yet operationally complex question: *Do the programs work?* A number of national evaluation studies and other research clearly show that government programs have had a major and significant impact on participation by minorities in higher education. However, those programs were given a set of broad, ambitious, and often unrealistic goals; it is now clear that not all intervention and support programs have accomplished their goals.

What then of the government's support for higher education during the 1980s? The Reagan Revolution begun in January 1981 will have a major impact on government social programs and the various roles of state and federal government in higher education. The proposed and already implemented cuts in federal programs come at a time when most states cannot afford to assume the costs of additional social programs. Moreover, these program reductions occur during a period of major demographic shifts: Although the number of minority youths in the college-aged cohort will remain relatively stable, the decline in the number of college-aged whites will increase the minority proportion from 14 percent to roughly 20 percent.

Participation by minorities has been and will remain a major concern of government policy makers. The principle of government support for education as part of larger policy concerns for equity and equality is firmly established. The task confronting educators and policy makers during the 1980s will be to enhance the effectiveness of government programs and at the same time to realize the limitations of government intervention in postsecondary education. The context and the effectiveness of previous efforts will shape future efforts to further expand and promote minority access to and participation in American higher education.

A Contextual and Historical Perspective

The transition from elite to mass to universal higher education in the United States during the years following World War II is the result of an expanded governmental presence in the higher education arena. This transition has been marked by a major shift in the federal role: from purchaser and consumer of university research to supporter and underwriter of expanded access to and participation in postsecondary education. Similarly, the state role in public higher education has changed dramatically: Public higher education, in part because of the expansion of two-year colleges, has evolved from a limited, low-cost, meritocratic system to one of open and potentially unlimited access to all citizens regardless of their ability to pay or their previous educational achievement.

The postwar concern for access to and equality of educational opportunity has been expressed in a number of government policy statements, judicial decisions, and legislative acts. The first strong expression was the 1947 report of the President's Commission on Higher Education. Another was the historic *Brown* decision, based upon case law that evolved from judicial challenges to the doctrine of "separate but equal" as practiced in higher education (Kluger 1975; Preer 1982). The great social upheavals stimulated by the civil rights movement and the subsequent policy linkage forged between education and employment had a tremendous impact on state and federal higher education policy.

At the federal level, the Great Society legislation engineered by Lyndon Johnson altered the course of American higher education by emphasizing federal support for college access and by directing federal aid to students rather than to institutions. Before 1965, "the federal role had been defined in terms of meeting national needs rather than advancing individual citizen's rights to an education" (Frances 1980b, p. 27). This change in federal policy—from the "all who are able" focus of the National Defense Education Act of 1958 to the "all who can benefit" concerns of the Higher Education Act of 1965—led eventually to the entitlement provisions of the Pell Grant program (formerly Basic Educational Opportunity Grant program) established by the Education Amendments of 1972.

The changing federal role in higher education has been reflected in the rapid expansion of student aid and related support programs coupled with the leveling off of constant dollar funding for federal research and development (R&D) projects in the period from 1965 to 1977. These two trends resulted in dramatic shifts in the allocation of federal higher education expenditures. Thus, in 1967, 65 percent of those expenditures went for institutional support, largely in the form of R&D funding, and allocations for student aid amounted to only 35 percent of the total. By 1975, student aid totaled 72 percent of federal outlays for higher education, and support for institutions dropped to 28 percent (Carlson 1978; see also Sloan Commission 1980). In the 1976–77 academic year*, federal outlays for

*Here and elsewhere in the report the reader may find the data somewhat dated. One casualty of recent federal budget cuts has been collection of data and educational statistics.

student aid accounted for almost one-fourth of total (federal, state, local) government expenditures for higher education (Table 1) and for just over 80 percent of total government outlays for student aid (Table 2).

Although the rapid growth of federal higher education programs since 1965 has tended to overshadow the historic state role and responsibility for higher education, state expenditures for higher education have nonetheless exceeded those of the federal government (Table 1). In the years following World War II, state governments carried the major burden of broadening college access for the population at large by providing the bulk of the resources required for institutional expansion and systemwide growth. During the 25 years beginning in 1950, the number of public colleges and universities, including two-year institutions and branch campuses, increased 228 percent. Public institutions, which enrolled roughly one-half of all college students in 1950, accounted for better than three-fourths of all college enrollments by 1975, and this growth in the public sector occurred at the same time that total degree enrollments were increasing just over 400 percent (Finn 1978, Table 2.1).

Since 1965, first blacks and American Indians, and later Mexican-Americans, Puerto Ricans, and some Asian groups, have been the implicit if not the specific beneficiaries of a range of government programs intended to help "the disadvantaged" participate in higher education (see Fuller and McNamara 1978).

These postwar changes in state and federal policy define the broad context of government concern for equality of opportunity and greater participation by minorities in American higher education. The academic community, "enthusiastically sharing in the national fervor for equal opportunity and social mobility through education" (Finn 1978, p. 23), responded to a combination of government directives and incentives designed to promote participation by minorities in higher education and to increase their participation in the American occupational structure and in the mainstream of American life.

Government Responsibility for Higher Education

The nature of current government support for equal opportunity and for participation by minorities in higher education is best understood in the context of the overall nature of government responsibility for education.

The federal/state division. Both by constitutional design and by conscious political choice, education is primarily the responsibility of the individual states. While the federal presence may in some instances be more visible than that of the states, the federal government remains the junior partner—albeit an increasingly influential one—in the education enterprise (Keppel 1980). The federal role in education is both limited and specialized, usually takes the form of categorical grants, and aims at supplementing state and local efforts "to solve particularly urgent problems or provide various kinds of assistance and leadership to help . . . improve the quality of education" (Evans 1979, p. 1). In sum, national higher education

Table 1: Total Government Outlays for Higher Education in Academic Year 1976–77

Source	Amount (in millions)	Percentage
Total government outlay	$27,378.2	100.0
Federal government		
Research	2,717.0	9.9
Student aid	6,482.0	23.7
Other	2,532.4	9.2
State governments		
Institutional support	13,426.0	49.0
Student aid	589.3	2.2
Local governments	1,631.5	6.0

Source: Carnegie Council 1980, Table A-6.

Table 2: Total Government Outlays for Student Aid in Academic Year 1976–77

Source	Amount (in millions)	Percentage
Total outlays for student aid	$8,081.0	100.0
Federal programs	6,482.0	80.2
State programs	589.3	7.3
Institutional funds[a]	659.7	8.2
Private sources[b]	350.0	4.3

[a]Institutional expenditures for student aid, which may originate from both public and private sources.

[b]Estimated.

Source: Carnegie Council 1980, Table A-6.

policy is based on two factors: state support for "brick and mortar" issues such as public education and federal "carrot and stick" program incentives that emphasize research and public policy priorites.

The primacy of the state role in education and the constitutionally dictated balance of power among levels and branches of government invariably lead to conflict over priorities and programs.

> *The conventional wisdom acquired during the 1960s and 1970s suggests that the federal government has set the right agenda on such issues as civil rights, poverty, and policies for minority groups and the handicapped—issues which state governments have generally neglected (Keppel 1980, p. 149).*

Observing that the history of the past two decades shows an "uneasy relationship between federal purpose and state performance" on such educational issues as equal opportunity and desegregation, Keppel notes that policy makers and educators often forget that "the state's willingness to administer a program effectively is the key to success of the federal programs" (Keppel 1980, p. 149).

The tensions implicit in the gap between federal priorities and state performance are not new. They have characterized the federal/state relationship in the area of education since the enactment of the Morrill Act of 1862, which gave life to the land-grant college movement. The growing significance of the federal role in higher education, however, adds to the current tensions and highlights once again the distinct nature of federal and state roles. These tensions are not likely to be reduced so long as a wide gap exists between federal priorities and state and local performance and so long as litigation remains the primary form of redress for any perceived failure to meet espoused domestic priorites in the areas of education, opportunity, and equality.

The special federal responsibility for Indian education. The federal government has had a special historic responsibility and obligation for the education of American Indians. Education was a major part of almost all treaties negotiated between Indian nations and the federal government during the 19th century (Chavers 1974).

Before 1934, the federal government discharged its responsibilities by establishing schools for Indian children; the curricula of these schools were primarily vocational. The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 set the precedent of federal support for Indian higher education by authorizing federal loans for Indian students attending vocational and trade schools, high schools, and colleges. The loan program ended in 1952, but by then the Bureau of Indian Affairs was providing some scholarship support for college students under a small program begun in 1948 (McNamara 1980). This program has since been expanded, and others have also been developed; tribal self-sufficiency is the espoused goal of most of these efforts.

The recently authorized Tribally Controlled Community College As-

sistance Act of 1978 is the latest confirmation of the "federal role in Indian postsecondary education based on the legal responsibility which exists between the Indian community and the federal government" (U.S. Congress 1978, p. 6).

The Evolution of the Federal Role

Because the states have constitutional jurisdiction over education, the history of the federal presence and role in higher education can best be described as erratic, uncoordinated, and often peripheral to higher education itself. Yet despite the piecemeal history of federal legislation, federal policies have had a major impact on the development of American higher education. Before 1964, federal legislation on higher education was often tied to policy objectives in areas far removed from traditional educational concerns, such as land settlement and postwar recovery. The constitutional and historic responsibilities of the states, congressional reluctance to advance the federal presence in education, and an unresolved controversy over federal money for church-related and other private institutions all contributed to the delayed entry of the federal government into the higher education arena. Additionally, the absence of a national consensus regarding the potential role of the federal government in postsecondary education inhibited the federal presence. Only when national policy could be linked to educational activities—first in the interest of national defense and later as part of a federal drive to expand opportunity and promote equality—did the federal government begin to develop a conceptual framework for its growing presence in higher education.

Pre-1964: national interest and national defense. The occasional federal forays into higher education before 1964 were generally linked to various national concerns in areas often marginally related to higher education, leading to the haphazard evolution of what might be called a contextually defined "quality/equality cycle" in federal higher education policy. Specific concerns about quality were explicit in the legislation; underlying principles of egalitarianism were often implicit, however, and would in time become dominant.

The Land-Grant College Movement. The Morrill Act of 1862 provided federal incentives for the growth, development, and curricular focus of public colleges and universities, thereby altering the development of American higher education. State colleges and universities—at that time floundering and often neglected institutions—were given new life and direction by the land-grant college movement (Rudolph 1962). The practical and agricultural curricula stipulated by the legislation reflected egalitarian interests in an era marked by more aristocratic educational priorities.

Nothing in the first Morrill Act (1862) specifically prohibited blacks from participating in the land-grant college movement, nor did the legislation specifically require the establishment of special colleges for blacks, although four states did use some of their Morrill money for that purpose.

Indeed, President Lincoln signed the legislation five months before issuing the Emancipation Proclamation. However, "education was recognized as fundamental to the uplift of the freedman, and Black colleges were established to meet what were perceived as his particular educational needs" (Preer 1982, p. 182). Congressional and educational supporters of the Negro cause sought to extend educational opportunities for blacks by making legislative provisions that would guarantee Negroes' participation in the land-grant movement. The second Morrill Act (1890) denied funds to those states whose land-grant colleges practiced racial discrimination in admissions, although it did permit compliance through the provision of "separate-but-equal" facilities, provided that funds were divided in a just and equitable manner (Preer 1982).

The second Morrill Act forced the states to take some action on the education of Negroes. Not until the peak of the Civil Rights movement some 75 years later would Congress again take such a stance: Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 used federal funding as a weapon to enforce state compliance in the area of discrimination, while Title III of the Higher Education Act of 1965 provided some direct federal assistance to the nation's historically black colleges.

The GI Bill. More than two million veterans of World War II used the educational benefits authorized by the Serviceman's Readjustment Act of 1944 (the GI Bill) to pursue some form of postsecondary education (Axt 1952). The GI Bill was the first large-scale federal program to provide direct assistance to individuals seeking education or training beyond high school. As amended in December 1945, the legislation authorized a maximum of 48 months of education benefits, including both tuition support and a living subsidy for returning veterans.

By accident or intent, the GI Bill was largely responsible for the postwar surge in enrollments; it brought to the nation's campuses thousands of former servicemen who otherwise would not have attended college, and thus contributed to a tremendous increase in upward social mobility. It is not clear that Congress had such egalitarian goals in mind when it first authorized the legislation in 1943; veterans' benefits were initially intended to assist disabled servicemen to obtain postwar jobs. The scope of the legislation was expanded in 1944 as much to reward returning servicemen as to assist in postwar economic recovery. Yet regardless of congressional intent, the legislation did provide educational benefits to many ex-GIs for whom a college education had been a goal for their children, not an aspiration deemed personally attainable.

Among the potential beneficiaries of the GI Bill were thousands of minority citizens who served in the armed forces during World War II. Yet it is difficult to determine the extent to which blacks and Indians—at that time the nation's most readily identifiable minorites—made use of the benefits of the GI Bill. Even though individuals were eligible for federal suport, the discriminatory admissions practices common to many public and private institutions may have served to restrict educational

access and opportunity. The egalitarian benefits of the legislation were not enjoyed equally by all returning veterans because of other conditions in postwar America.

The Truman Report. Harry Truman was the first of the postwar presidents to encourage federal support for equal educational opportunity. Conscious of the traditional educational responsibilities of the states (and of congressional opposition to a federal role in education), Truman advocated using federal funds to reduce inequalities in state educational expenditures. He expressed his views on the issue in his first State of the Union address in 1946:

> *The Federal government has not sought and will not seek to dominate education in the states. It should continue its historic role of leadership and advice and, for the purpose of equalizing educational opportunity, it should extend further financial support to the cause of education where this is desirable (Truman 1962, p. 65).*

In July 1946, President Truman appointed the first federal commission charged to examine the goals and functions of higher education in American society. Truman asked the commission to "examine our system of higher education in terms of its objectives, methods, and facilities, and in light of the social role it has to play in American society. The commission was also directed to help define a role for the federal government in higher education (Axt 1952).

The six-volume report of the President's Commission on Higher Education (1947) espoused a broad set of egalitarian goals and policy objectives, not all of which were warmly received by the higher education community or Congress. The commission called for an end to racial and religious discrimination in higher education:

> *Discrimination in the admission of college students because of an individual's race, creed, color, sex, national origin, or ancestry is an antidemocratic practice which creates serious inequalities in the opportunity for higher education. The Commission is opposed to discrimination and believes it should be abandoned (President's Commission 1947, vol. 2, p. 25).*

It also advocated the expansion of public colleges and universities especially for two-year institutions, as an effective way to expand and equalize educational opportunities for all citizens. Many of the commission's recommendations assumed a greatly increased federal role in higher education, specifically, the use of federal dollars to underwrite a national policy of low or no tuition for the first two years of postsecondary education, including vocational training in the community colleges (Axt 1952).

Truman's statements and the commission's recommendations underscored growing federal concern for nondiscrimination and for the exten-

sion of educational opportunity in American life. As visualized by Truman and the commission, an expanding public sector would serve national interests and would address egalitarian concerns.

The National Defense Education Act of 1958. The academic community's lukewarm response to the Truman report and congressional opposition to an expanded federal presence in education served to restrict the federal role in higher education for the next 10 years. During this period, Congress provided some funds for the construction of dormitories on college campuses. The establishment of the National Science Foundation in 1950 signaled federal interest in the research and development capacity of the nation's universities. Congress also reauthorized the GI Bill, extending benefits to veterans of the Korean conflict. During this same period, litigation initiated by the NAACP, culminating in the historic 1954 *Brown* decision, firmly established the educational rights of blacks to equal and quality education.

Russian technological advances during the 1950s, culminating in the launching of Sputnik I in October 1957, stimulated renewed federal interest in education, in this instance to serve the interests of "national defense." The following year, in the wake of heated public debate and with great fanfare, Congress passed and President Eisenhower signed Public Law 84–864, the National Defense Education Act (NDEA) of 1958.

The NDEA firmly established a federal presence at all levels of education yet generally left to the states the management of funded programs, including science curriculum projects, low-interest undergraduate loans, language training, and media development programs. The legislation authorized:

> *programs that will give assurance that no* student of ability *will be denied an opportunity for higher education because of financial need. . . . Congress reaffirms the principle and declares that the States and local communities have and must retain primary control over and primary responsibility for public education. The national interest requires, however, that the Federal Government give assistance to education for programs which are important to national defense (P.L. 84–864, sec. 101, emphasis added).*

NDEA programs marked a new phase in federal concern for higher education. The ancillary concerns about domestic policy tied to previous federal legislation on higher education were raised to a new level of seriousness by Sputnik. The 1958 legislation extended and expanded the federal presence and formally linked it to issues of national defense and security. So strong was the prevailing sense of crisis, so political were the issues involved, and so pronounced and widespread was the support for some sort of federal action that Congressman Adam Clayton Powell of Harlem, then powerful chairman of the House Education and Labor Committee, declined to attach his standard antisegregation amendment to the

House bill, claiming it would be "inappropriate" (Babbidge and Rosenzweig 1962, p. 172).

NDEA programs were offered as a temporary measure—federal assistance to resolve a short-term crisis. Nonetheless, the legislation firmly established a federal interest and presence in higher education, one that provided too many dollars to be permitted to withdraw quietly. The precedent set by the legislation paved the way for a set of broader, more ambitious social goals for higher education that would be proposed by the Johnson administration only six years later.

The Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963. Although the Truman report espoused an ambitious set of educational and social goals for the growing number of public two-year colleges, it was not until 1963 that these institutions were specifically identified and supported by federal legislation. Two-year colleges were allocated 22 percent of the federal construction assistance funds authorized by Title I of the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963. Before 1963, these institutions had been neither specifically included nor specifically excluded from federal education programs. The postwar growth and expansion of two-year colleges remained the domain of the states and local communities.

Post-1964: the Great Society and beyond. If the federal presence in higher education had little or no conceptual rationale through the end of the 1950s, subsequent events would serve to define a federal role and responsibility linked to domestic policy initiatives, specifically in the area of civil rights. Beginning in 1964, Lyndon Johnson challenged the American people and the Congress to rally around a broad and ambitious set of objectives and programs designed to reduce poverty, assure civil rights and nondiscrimination, expand educational opportunity, improve the quality of education, eradicate urban problems, and promote the welfare of minorities and other disadvantaged groups in American society.

President Kennedy had identified the close relationship between education and economic or occupational opportunity in a message to Congress on June 19, 1963:

> *This Nation is in critical need of a massive upgrading in its educational and training effort for all its citizens. In an age of rapidly changing technology, that effort is failing millions of our youth. It is especially failing Negro youth in segregated schools and crowded slums. If we are ever to lift them from the morass of social and economic degradation, it will be through the strengthening of our education and training services—by improving the quality of instruction [and] by increasing opportunities and incentives for all individuals to complete their education and to continue their self-development during adulthood (Kennedy 1964, p. 489).*

Kennedy's aides were working on policy proposals at the time of his death. Lyndon Johnson took those programs and made them his own,

expanding, altering, and adjusting them to fit his particular vision (Levitan 1969). Johnson's top priorities were civil rights legislation and anti-poverty programs. Announcing the War on Poverty in his 1964 State of the Union address, Johnson explicitly described the goals and the commitments of his administration:

> *Let me make one principle of this administration abundantly clear: All of these increased opportunities [I propose]—in employment, in education, in housing, and in every field—must be open to Americans of every color. As far as the writ of Federal law will run, we must abolish not some, but all racial discrimination. For this is not merely an economic issue, or a social, political, or international issue. It is a moral issue . . . (Johnson 1965, p. 116).*

A number of factors and political forces made it relatively easy to link the civil rights issue with the war against poverty and federal aid for education. First, the statistical argument:

> *The increasing amount of statistics [particularly the 1960 census data] generated on the "Negro question" made it transparently clear that a disproportionate number of Negroes were to be found in the ranks of the unskilled, the unemployed, and the poverty stricken (Levitan 1969, p. 15).*

Second, political leaders—Democrats in general and Lyndon Johnson in particular—were responsive to the growing presence and political influence of the civil rights movement. And finally:

> *spokesmen for federal funding for education argued . . . that anti-poverty program[s] provided an excellent opportunity to bypass the church-state controversy and provide federal aid . . . for education (Levitan 1969, p. 2).*

All the pieces and all the actors were in place. With three sweeping pieces of legislation—the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Higher Education Act of 1965—Johnson radically transformed the federal role and presence in higher education. The Economic Opportunity Act, oriented toward disadvantaged youths, authorized two programs intended to promote access to college: Upward Bound was designed to help the disadvantaged gain entry into colleges and universities, while the College Work-Study program provided subsidized, on-campus, part-time employment for needy students. The Civil Rights Act prohibited discriminatory practices in federally supported programs; like the second Morrill Act of some 70 years earlier, it used federal funding as a "carrot and stick" to enforce compliance. And the Higher Education Act espoused a broad set of egalitarian objectives for American higher education, providing federally funded undergraduate scholarships based on need, an expanded work-study program, and federal funds to

assist "struggling colleges . . . removed from the main currents of academic life" (P.L. 89–329, sec. 301).

In the years following 1965, these programs were expanded and others with complementary objectives were developed. In 1968, President Johnson requested and received congressional support for programs to address the nonfinancial barriers to college attendence and completion encountered by disadvantaged students (the TRIO programs).* Federal financial support to promote universal access to postsecondary education was established as national policy by the Education Amendments of 1972; the provisions of the legislation for Basic Educational Opportunity Grants created an entitlement program of financial assistance to low-income college students. Clearly the focus of federal higher education policy in the years since 1965 has been the promotion of increased access to and participation in higher education—a broad set of egalitarian goals supported by a variety of federal programs intended to address the financial and nonfinancial difficulties affecting the matriculation and completion of degrees by disadvantaged students.

Summary

The postwar transition from elite to mass to universal higher education has been accompanied by major changes in state and federal support for higher education. State governments have assumed a "brick and mortar" approach to expanding access, providing funds to support the growth and expansion of public systems of postsecondary education—expanding the capacity of postsecondary educational systems. In contrast, federal policy has focused on removing the financial and nonfinancial barriers to college access and degree attainment, in part linked to larger domestic policy objectives in such areas as social equality and job opportunity.

Federal and to a lesser extent state policies have identified minority students and minority institutions as specific beneficiaries of many categorical programs. Since 1965, blacks, and American Indians, and later Mexican-Americans and Puerto Ricans have been the implicit if not specific beneficiaries of a range of federal and state programs intended to promote participation by minorities in American higher education and, through education, in the mainstream of American economic and social life.

*The TRIO programs are Upward Bound, Talent Search, and Special Services for Disadvantaged Students.

The Role of the States

The rapid growth of federal programs for higher education since 1965 has a tendency to overshadow the state presence in higher education. The states—not the federal government—assumed the major costs and burdens of expanding public higher education in the years following World War II. Currently the states "contribute more to the total higher education budget than either the federal government, or students and their families" (Sloan Commission 1980, p. 14). In the 1976–77 academic year, state governments contributed more than 40 percent of the $32+ billion spent for educational and general purposes in American higher education (see Table 3). In 1978, the states spent $2.42 for every dollar supplied by the federal government for general institutional support (National Center for Education Statistics 1980, p. 162). Consistent with constitutional intent, the states remain the senior partner in the relationship among the three levels of government in the higher education arena.

Issues of Access and Educational Opportunity

State support for "brick and mortar" issues during the postwar years implicitly addressed the issue of access and educational opportunity before those concerns rose to the federal policy agenda:

> *The primary legal and financial responsibility for meeting the educational needs of the American people resides with the states. For the last two decades state energies and resources in higher education have focused on the expansion of opportunity in response to rapid growth of the college-age population, higher proportions of high school graduates, and increased participation rates. Since the 1960 California* Master Plan for Higher Education, *the first formal state commitment to provide education after high school to all who had the desire and motivation to benefit, the states have been at the forefront of the national movement to improve access. The state master plans developed during the sixties and early seventies were essentially blueprints for increasing access, and they led to dramatic increases in the numbers of programs and institutions of post-secondary education. The approaches used by the states have varied but generally have included some combination of ensuring geographic proximity, enlarging institutions, developing new institutions and programs (most notably community colleges and vocational programs), providing student financial assistance, and increasing institutional support (Callan 1978, pp. 54–55).*

Callan adds that while the federal role has become increasingly important and financially significant, the states are primarily responsible for "the task for linking factors related to access—student aid, various forms of institutional support, and articulation between high schools and colleges, . . . ideally working in collaboration with campuses" (p. 55). He notes that although the goal of equal access and opportunity has yet to be fully realized, the progress of the past two decades has indeed been significant.

Table 3: Sources of Income for Educational and General Expenditures in Higher Education in Academic Year 1976–77

Institutional Type	*Percentage of Educational and General Income*				Total Expenditures (in millions)
	Federal Government	State Governments	Local Governments	Private Sources[a]	
All institutions	16.4	41.6	5.1	36.9	$32,208.7
Public institutions	15.7	57.4	6.6	20.3	22,879.5
Private institutions	17.1	3.2	1.2	77.9	9,408.9

[a]Includes tuition, fees, and student aid program funds (e.g., Pell Grants).

Source: Carnegie Council 1980, Supplement A, Tables A-1, A-2, A-3.

Not all observers would agree with this assessment, however. Although state higher education agencies are concerned about access and educational opportunity, a number of other issues appear to have higher priority, at least as indicated in annual agency reports (Millard 1976, p. 59). And although the states did create the structures needed to accommodate increasing numbers of students, many critics argue that they have not been as successful in dealing with the real heart of the issue, i.e., increasing the rates of entry and retention of nontraditional students in all segments of public higher education. Federal initiatives and incentives, particularly financial aid programs, have been responsible for much of the movement of minority students into public colleges. Yet minority enrollments are greatest in those public institutions with the fewest educational resources, the two-year colleges (Olivas 1979). And the *Adams* case, which addresses the resources, role, and mission of historically black public colleges in state systems of higher education, serves as a lingering reminder of the impacts of previous state policies and practices.*

Public policy generally has focused on the issue of access to any postsecondary institution, assuming approximately equivalent impacts and benefits of college attendance, an assumption not supported by nearly three decades of research on college students and institutional impacts (see Feldman and Newcomb 1969, Chapter 11; Astin 1977b, Chapter 9; Astin 1982, Chapter 5). The meritocratic criteria frequently found in state master plans, criteria that link institutional and program quality with student attributes (e.g., grades, test scores) can serve to restrict student access (see Astin 1982, pp. 154–69). The 1960 California *Master Plan for Higher Education* exemplifies the tendency to use student attributes as attributes of institutional quality:

> *The quality of an institution and that of a system of higher education are determined to a considerable extent by the abilities of those it admits and retains as students. This applies at all levels—lower division, upper division, and graduate. It is also true for all segments, but the emphases are different. The junior colleges are required by law to accept all high school graduates (and even some nongraduates under some circumstances); therefore, the junior colleges must protect their quality by applying retention standards rigid enough to guarantee that taxpayers' money is not wasted on individuals who lack the capacity or the will to succeed in their studies. If the state college and the university have real differences of function between them, they should be exacting (in contrast to public education in most other states) because the junior colleges relieve them of the burden of doing remedial work. Both have the heavy obligation to the state to restrict the privilege of entering and remaining to those who are well above average in the college-age group (California State Department of Education 1960, p. 66).*

Adams v. Richardson, 365FSupp. 92 (D.C. 1973) modified for 480 E.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973).

As this statement makes clear, the 1960 California master plan was based on a meritocratic model of program and institutional excellence that provides greater resources and educational opportunities for a selected subgroup.

The impacts of this meritocratic perspective on access are clearly reflected in expenditure patterns across the three levels of public higher education. Governmental appropriations favor universities over four-year and two-year colleges (Table 4). State appropriations (which now also include some financial aid funds), the major source of revenue for public higher education, increase by one-third at each level of the educational hierarchy. And although the two-year colleges receive significant funding from local governments, reflecting the community orientation of these institutions, their mean total governmental appropriation is still less than that of the four-year colleges. Mean expenditure figures reveal pronounced differences in resources among the three levels of public higher education (Table 5). Mean expenditures per FTE (full-time equivalent) student—perhaps the best available index of an institution's investment in its students—are higher at each level of the hierarchy. The difference between two-year and four-year colleges is roughly 11 percent, while the differences between universities and two-year and four-year colleges are 59 and 43 percent, respectively. This range in expenditures is found in other areas as well: instruction, libraries, financial aid, and subsidy. The amounts for subsidy are significant because they measure the net institutional support (or subsidy) above student charges. University students receive a mean subsidy of $4,074 over and above tuition charges, compared to a mean subsidy of $2,753 in the four-year colleges and $2,474 in the two-year colleges, a 65 percent difference between the university student and his or her counterpart in a two-year college. These figures suggest that one significant aspect of the issues related to access is the distribution of educational resources—and the concentration of those resources in the "least accessible" institutions (see Astin 1977b; Astin 1982, Chapter 7).

The figures for expenditures reflect, in part, perceptions of the differing costs of access (at two- and four-year colleges) and excellence (at universities). Clark Kerr (1963) was among the first to describe the access-versus-excellence debate from the standpoint of the states, warning that state governments would find it difficult to satisfy the academic community's heightened expectations for expanded programs and improved quality at the same time they were accommodating the increasing numbers of high school graduates seeking a degree. Indeed, the states' interest in and responsibility for educational access and opportunity at all degree levels and for all citizens—not just recent high school graduates—may well conflict with traditional notions of academic quality. In many states, however, perceptions about the attributes of quality are expanding to include issues of educational process and characteristics of input from students and faculty. This shift in perspective is largely a response to the demands from a number of constituencies for an accounting of the resources allocated to public postsecondary education and the availability

Table 4: Mean Government Appropriations for Public Higher Education in Academic Year 1977–78
(Appropriation per FTE Student, by Institutional Type[a])

	Institutional Type	Number	Federal Appropriations (in millions)	State Appropriations (in millions)	Local Appropriations (in millions)
14	All public institutions	1,142	$ 72	$1,734	$387
15	Universities	119	137	2,538	18
16	Four-year colleges	379	42	2,046	88
17	Two-year colleges	923	76	1,502	557

[a]The greater cost of graduate and professional education was discounted by weighting each graduate student by a factor of 3.0.

Source: Higher Education General Information Survey (HEGIS) (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1978). Unpublished data, analysis by the author.

Table 5: Mean FTE Expenditures for Public Higher Education in Academic Year 1977–78
(Expenditure per FTE Student, by Institutional Type[a])

Institutional Type	Number	Educational and General	Instructional	Funded Research	Library	Financial Aid[b]	Subsidy[c]
				expenditures in millions of dollars			
All public institutions	1,142	$3,145	$1,495	$105	$125	$100	$2,682
Universities	119	4,638	1,761	924	166	160	4,074
Four-year colleges	379	3,251	1,487	90	150	149	2,753
Two-year colleges	923	2,909	1,464	6	110	71	2,474

[a]The greater cost of graduate and professional education was discounted by weighting each graduate student by a factor of 3.0.

[b]Includes those financial aid funds, both restricted and unrestricted, awarded by the institution to the individual student, including certain federal and state funds (e.g., work-study, NDSL funds), but *not* including Pell Grants or other similar aids awarded directly to the student from the government.

[c]Subsidy measures the extent to which institutions subsidize students' educational costs. It is calculated using the following formula: FTE Subsidy = FTE E&G + FTE Financial Aid − FTE Tuition.

Source: Higher Education General Information Survey, National Center for Education Statistics, 1978. Unpublished data, analysis by the author.

and distribution of educational opportunitites to various clientele (Callan 1978). State program reviews, with their focus on accountability for resources, equality of educational opportunity, and quality in education programs, also contribute to a new awareness of the nature of the states' responsibility for higher education (Green 1981b).

Recent court decisions could also affect the traditional state perspective on equal access, equal opportunity, and quality in public higher education. In the *Adams* case, as in other desegregation litigation, the concern is for full and equal participation in public education: The state has a responsibility to ensure that institutions charged with similar missions have similar resources (i.e., that they operate programs and have facilities of comparable quality). States affected by the *Adams* decision are required to "define the mission of each [higher education] institution within the state on a basis other than race (e.g., level, range, and scope of degree [programs])" (*Federal Register* 1978, p. 6661).

A growing body of evidence suggests, however, that the notion of specialized institutional mission may conflict with the concept of equal educational opportunity, at least in those instances and in those states where the institutional mission is defined in terms of the special—though nonracial—characteristics (e.g., high school grades, test scores) of a potential client population, as is the case in California. Some observers suggest that educational opportunity—and access to educational resources—based on meritocratic criteria is not real educational opportunity (see Astin 1977b; Astin 1982, Chapter 7; Commission on the Higher Education of Minorities 1982, pp. 29–30; Olivas 1979). Although educators and lawyers differ in their perceptions and definitions of equal educational opportunity (Preer 1982), the precedents established by *Adams* could have a profound impact on those states that operate highly stratified systems of higher education where students' access to quality higher education (and its subsequent benefits in the areas of personal, academic, and career development) is restricted by the mission of the particular institutions in which students of differing achievement are eligible to enroll.

The amended *Adams* criteria for the desegregation of public higher education issued by the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in 1977 (*Federal Register* 1978) extended the notion of access beyond the racial head counting that stimulated the original litigation. The revised criteria focus on parity of both students and institutions: *student parity* as measured by the proportional participation of blacks based on rates of graduation from high school and patterns of college matriculation and persistence, and *institutional parity* as measured by increased participation by blacks in goverance, on faculties, and across programs, as well as among students (Preer 1982).

State Programs for the Disadvantaged

The size of and funding for state programs for the disadvantaged are small compared to the federal programs. Some states operate sizable programs of financial aid and support while others have only recently begun to

develop such programs. Several factors appear to affect the states' perspective on this issue: the size and political influence of the state's minority population, legislative and gubernatorial interest (in part perhaps a reflection of minorities' political influence), the size of and diversity in public and private higher education in the state, competition in and among public and private institutions, and, of course, litigation and court orders. In recent years, state governments have exhibited growing interest in and financial support for special minority programs. This trend may continue, if only at modest levels and in spite of growing financial pressures at the state level, as minorities become a growing proportion of the college-age cohort in the 1980s (Breneman and Nelson 1980): In their quest to maintain enrollments during the coming period of decline in the traditional college-age population, public institutions are likely to increase their efforts to recruit and retain minority students (see Frances 1980a). Federal incentives, such as the recent challenge-grant provisions of the revised developing institutions (Title III) legislation, as well as judicial directives (e.g., the *Adams* litigation) will continue to affect states' decisions about performance, programs, and funding. The impact of a stagnant or declining economy on state and federal budget priorities—affecting overall expenditures for education as well as expenditures for specific education programs—could adversely affect those programs, however. Indeed, California's post-Proposition 13 budget problems have led to some reductions in the state's Cal-Grants program (similar to the Pell Grant program) before the Reagan administration's efforts to initiate major changes in federal student aid programs in 1982.

Like the federal government, the states have focused most of their programmatic efforts in the area of financial assistance, in part because of federal incentives, namely the State Student Incentive Grant (SSIG) program. Although the federal government has shouldered the major costs of student aid since the National Defense Education Act of 1958 (Carnegie Council 1980, Supplement A), state contributions to student financial assistance are significant, totaling nearly $750 million in academic year (AY) 1977–78 (including $44 million or 5.8 percent federal SSIG funds) (see Table 6). Furthermore, while such state financial aid has traditionally been based on merit and/or achievement (e.g., New York State regents scholarships), of late these funds have also been used to assist low-income students, regardless of previous academic achievement.

Federal funds have indeed played an important role in stimulating the development and expansion of state programs for student financial assistance. In the two years following congressional authorization of the SSIG program, the number of states and territories offering such programs increased more than one-third, from 31 to 48, while the dollar value of those state awards, *not* including the federal matching funds, increased 26 percent (29 percent if the $20 million in AY 1975–76 SSIG federal dollars are included; see Table 6). Although SSIG funds are 50-50 matching grants, the $76.8 million federal appropriation in AY 1980–81 accounted for only 8 percent of the total award money. Moreover, SSIG funds com-

Table 6: State-Funded Need-Based Undergraduate Grant/Scholarship Programs

Academic Year	SSIG Funding[a] (in millions)	No. of States/ Territories	Total Awards[b] (No. of Students)	Total Awards[c] (in millions)
1969–70	None	19	470,000	$199.9
1970–71	None	21	535,200	236.6
1971–72	None	23	604,000	268.6
1972–73	None	29	661,700	315.5
1973–74	None	31	733,300	364.2
1974–75	19.0	37	813,100	440.8
1975–76	20.0	48	901,900	510.2
1976–77	44.0	55	1,104,400	651.4
1977–78	60.0	56	1,190,300	737.0
1978–79	63.8	57	1,217,400	789.2
1979–80	76.8	57	1,278,700	864.5
1980–81	76.8	57	1,319,800[d]	912.0

[a]The SSIG program was first authorized as part of the Education Amendments of 1972; funds were not appropriated until 1974.

[b]Rounded.

[c]Rounded dollars, including federal SSIG dollars.

[d]Estimated.

Source: U.S. Office of Education 1979, pp. 253, 255; U.S. Department of Education 1981, p. 379.

posed no more than 20 percent of state aid dollars in 21 states, and only 14 states made the minimum 50 percent contribution to the program (U.S. Office of Education 1979).

The variation in state support for student financial aid programs appears to be a function of the size of the private sector of education in the individual states. SSIG funds are concentrated in those states with a large private sector, in part because many of those states had developed their own aid programs independent of or concurrent with the authorization of the SSIG program in 1972 (Carlson 1978). In the early years of the SSIG program, over 50 percent of the state scholarship funds went to students attending private institutions (Hartman 1978, p. 252). Many of the states took advantage of the "wide latitude" they had to manage SSIG funds in the first years of the program and specifically limited eligibility to students at either public or private institutions; however, "in spite of its modest size and other idiosyncracies, [the SSIG] program has considerable significance as the one federal student aid program that attempts purposefully to mesh national and state efforts" (Finn 1978, p. 80). And even with these restrictions and limitations, data from the early years of the program suggest that low-income students have been the primary beneficiaries: In AY 1975–76, students from families with annual incomes under $12,000 received 72.3 percent of all SSIG aid funds and accounted for 71.3 percent of all SSIG recipients (U.S. Office of Education 1979).

In addition to the SSIG program, a number of states (e.g., California, Illinois, New York, New Jersey, and Wisconsin) have appropriated funds for campus-based affirmative action grant programs and recruitment at the graduate and/or professional levels. Although the terms and provisions vary from state to state, these programs, like other affirmative action programs, seek to encourage minority access to public institutions, generally four-year colleges and universities with traditionally low minority enrollments. In the southern states affected by the *Adams* litigation, such efforts and programs are often part of state compliance plans (see Haynes 1979).

Among the individual states, New York operates one of the most extensive and expensive efforts to extend educational opportunities to the disadvantaged. The New York Board of Regents coordinates a legislatively funded educational opportunity program in the state system (SUNY) and New York City system (CUNY) and also among New York State's 200-plus independent colleges and universities. In AY 1978–79, the legislature appropriated $27 million for direct support of educational opportunity programs in postsecondary institutions in the state: $7.97 million for the independent sector, $7.31 million for the SUNY system, and $11.77 million for the CUNY system (State University of New York 1979). Total expenditures (from all sources, including federal, state, local, and private funds) for educational opportunity programs in New York's private institutions exceeded $40 million in AY 1978–79, 80 percent of which was allocated for student financial aid and the balance used for support services (State University of New York 1979, p. 52). In addition to its campus-based

programs, the SUNY system also operates Educational Opportunity Centers, which assist disadvantaged students to bridge the gap between high school and college. Supported by a state appropriation of $11.8 million in AY 1978–79, the centers offer services and programs in the following areas: (1) basic education; (2) college preparation; (3) vocational and occupational preparation; and (4) related support services (State University of New York 1978).

California is another state with a large minority population and extensive state-funded educational outreach and academic support programs. Total expenditures for these programs in California's public postsecondary institutions exceeded $40 million in AY 1980–81; nearly 75 percent of those funds were provided by the state. Although the federal government funded approximately one-half of the outreach activities in California public institutions in 1980–81 (with a total expenditure of $14.8 million), the state provided 88.3 percent of the $25.6 million spent on campus-based academic support programs (California Postsecondary Education Commission 1981). In addition to outreach and support services, the state of California also operates an extensive array of student financial assistance programs that supplement and complement federal financial aid programs: Funding for those programs exceeded $74 million in AY 1979–80 (California Postsecondary Education Commission 1981).

California officials have also explicitly acknowledged the role and significance of local officials and institutions in these outreach and support programs. The recently authorized CAL-SOAP (California Student Opportunity and Access Program) legislation provides state funds for consortium projects involving school districts and postsecondary institutions. Regional consortiums identify their own set of goals and activities, and each consortium partner has an equal financial responsibility, generally fulfilled with hard budget dollars rather than soft, short-term grant funds. Initial reports indicate that the consortium efforts are successful and that these kinds of partnerships—between schools and two-year and four-year colleges—promote institutional commitment to participation by minorities as well as increased access to postsecondary education.

Summary

The states have shouldered the major responsibility for increasing and expanding educational access and opportunity during the postwar era. The rapid expansion of public higher education since 1945 and the extensive federal financial aid programs since 1974 have in theory created open access to public higher education. Yet the variation in allocation of resources and the concentration of educational resources in the "least accessible" public institutions challenge the general notion that open-access education is equal education. And it was federal programs, not state policy, that initially stimulated most outreach and support activities in most public institutions during the 1960s and 1970s.

Individual states have developed various programs of aid and assistance. Increased emphasis on program review has focused new attention

on the nature of the states' responsibility for higher education and has forced both the states and individual public institutions to assess the degree to which they must be accountable for resources, provide equal educational opportunity, and offer high quality academic programs.

Although the vast majority of public two- and four-year institutions currently offer some type of special programs for disadvantaged students (Roueche and Snow 1977), state support for such programs seems more likely to be found as part of the general budgetary appropriation for higher education rather than as a special categorical program. Presidents of public senior colleges report that gubernatorial and legislative interests and initiatives can and do affect institutional priorities in this area:

> *One reason often given by state political leaders for assuming authority over public institutions is that higher education fails to respond to the needs of students and society without prodding, planning, and initiative from the state level. Indeed, increased authority for the governor (and to a lesser extent the legislature) has a greater positive relationship to new programs for ethnic minorities (Glenny et al. 1976, p. 79).*

At the same time, constituency politics can affect the course and the form of various legislative initiatives as members of a minority caucus use their influence and votes to amend bills in ways perceived to be beneficial to minority consitutents (see Berdahl 1978, pp. 328–29). The demographic shifts of the next decade will likely increase legislative interest in these issues.

The changing demography of the traditional college-age cohort and changing attitudes toward government spending create new challenges for both the states and for public higher education. The needs of both clients and constituencies will expand the traditional state role and responsibility in higher education.

Impacts of Policies and Programs

> *Policies imply theories. Whether stated explicitly or not, policies point to a chain of causation between initial conditions and future consequences. If X, then Y. Policies become programs when, by authoritative action, the initial conditions are created. Programs make their theories operational by forging the first link in the causal chain connecting actions to objectives. Given X, we act to obtain Y. Implementation then, is the ability to forge subsequent links in the causal chain to obtain the desired results (Pressman and Wildavsky 1973, p. xv).*

Federal programs that contribute to minorities' participation in higher education can be grouped into four major categories: student financial assistance, special (categorical) assistance to promote access and persistence, institutional aid, and support for professional training and human resource development (Table 7). Since 1964, presidents, educational leaders, and government policy makers have espoused a broad and ambitious set of goals for a range of government programs to assist and support minorities' participation in higher education. Six complementary federal programs attempt to eliminate the financial barriers to college attendance. Four major intervention programs, a series of implicitly linked and dynamic support programs that address the nonfinancial barriers to access and persistence, begin in the junior and senior high schools and carry through the undergraduate degree program. One major institutional aid program assists colleges that have a history of service to low-income and disadvantaged students; participants in this program include many of the historically black institutions and some tribal community colleges, among others. Other special federal programs assist and facilitate human resource development in various fields and specializations.

Many of these programs, particularly those that provide categorical assistance and support for professional training and human resource development, are by statute directed at minorities. In some instances—e.g., financial aid programs—minority students are not the statutory beneficiaries, yet disproportionately high participation by minorities in these programs clearly shows their significance to minority groups' goals and interests. Both the number and funding levels of these programs have increased rapidly during the period from 1965 to 1981 (see Astin 1982, Chapter 6, for a fuller explanation of this typology).

The underlying concept of current federal policy on higher education rests on the link between education and economic opportunity. American higher education policy—the expansion of college access and the elimination of financial and nonfinancial barriers that impede matriculation and degree completion—is tied to a theory of social mobility and economic opportunity. Higher education has become the chosen vehicle of American social policy: Increased educational attainment by minorities yields increased participation by minorities in the American occupational structure, the rewards of the American economic system, and the mainstream of American life.

Fifteen years into the great social and educational experiment that

Table 7: A Typology of Federal Higher Education Programs to Assist Minorities

Program	1981 Funding (in millions)
Student financial aid programs	
Pell Grants	$2,346.0
Supplemental Educational Opportunity Grants	370.0
College Work-Study Program (federal share)	550.0
National Direct Student Loan Program	186.0
Guaranteed Student Loan Program (loan volume)	7,735.0
State Student Incentive Grants	76.8
Special programs (access and persistence)	
Educational Opportunity Centers	8.0
Talent Search	17.0
Upward Bound	67.0
Special Services for Disadvantaged Students	64.0
College Assistance Migrant Programs	1.2
Institutional aid programs	
Land-Grant College Appropriations (Dept. of Education)	2.9
Land-Grant College Appropriations (Dept. of Agriculture)	18.0
Tribally Controlled Community Colleges	25.0*
Strengthening Developing Institutions	120.0
Professional training and human resource development	
Minority Access to Research Careers	4.5
Minority Biomedical Research Support	18.7
Legal Training for the Disadvantaged	1.0
Bilingual Education Programs	157.0
Indian Education—Fellowships for Indian Students (Dept. of Education)	1.5
Indian Education—Higher Education Grants (Dept. of Interior)	26.9
Health Professions Recruitment Program for Indians	1.1*
Health Professions Preparatory Scholarship Program for Indians	0.8*
	3.6*
Prefreshman and Cooperative Education for Minorities and Indians	1.0
Staff Training for Special Programs Leadership Personnel	0.8
Graduate and Professional Opportunities Fellowship Program	10.0
Minority Institutions Science Improvement Program	5.0

*Estimated.

Source: Green 1981a, updated by author.

gave birth and direction to these federal programs, we confront seemingly simple yet operationally complex questions: Do these programs work? How well do they do what we hoped they would do? Have these programs been able to meet our objectives and expectations? These are not easy questions.

The following sections review the foremost of these federal programs: financial aid, interventions for access and persistence, and institutional assistance.

Federal Financial Aid Programs

The Higher Education Act of 1965 authorized several financial aid programs that subsequently altered the course of federal higher education policy: Washington would underwrite programs to remove the financial barriers to college attendance. Currently five federal programs attempt to assist *access* to higher education and promote *choice* of institution. A sixth provides federal incentives for the states to develop or expand financial aid programs to assist particularly needy students.

Several sources document the importance of federal aid programs in attaining the goals of educational equity, equality of educational opportunity, and increased participation by minorities in higher education. "Perhaps as much as or more than equity by family income, considerations of racial equity were the driving forces behind the student aid programs of the late 1960s and early 1970s" (Leslie 1977, p. 29). Grants and related financial assistance cover a significant portion of minority students' college costs. Indeed, the dramatic increases in minority enrollments during the past decade have been both encouraged and underwritten by federal policies and financial aid programs (Leslie 1977).

Federal aid policy has attempted to reduce the overall cost of college attendance by reducing the "net cost" (i.e., out-of-pocket dollars) on the basis of family income and ability to pay. Minority students, with the exception of American Indians, encounter lower net costs for higher education than do their white counterparts. Income differentials among and between the various groups explain much of the differences in net costs: Basic grants serve as the primary mechanism for equalizing and/or reducing net costs. It is difficult to question the overall success of these policies for encouraging and underwriting minority access to postsecondary education: Minority enrollments increased dramatically during the past decade (Leslie 1977; Frances 1980a; Preer 1982).

The issue of the impact of aid is larger than the question of *access*—*whether* a student attends college; it also encompasses the issue of *choice*—*where* a student attends. Years of research on the impact of college on students (e.g., Feldman and Newcomb 1969; Astin 1977b; Solmon and Taubman 1973; Bowen 1978; Pace 1979) document a range of different and significant institutional impacts on persistence, satisfaction, personal development, and prospects for employment. The public policies that guided federal financial aid programs during their early years focused almost exclusively (if somewhat simplistically) on the issue of access, generally

without regard for the larger consequences of choice and institutional impact (Astin 1977a; Astin 1982). Given different impacts by institutions, the discussion of financial aid and institutional choice is an important one. Typically an offer of financial aid is a package of various forms of aid—e.g., Pell Grant funds plus perhaps some work-study money and maybe some loan money—particularly for minority students. Institutions do use discretion in their offers of campus-based aid programs, because the way financial aid offers are packaged can be a potent recruiting tool for institutions seeking to increase minority enrollments. Students are sensitive to the different costs of various aid packages, for example, the difference between a package offering a low grant and a high loan and one offering a high grant and little or no loan.

The results of one major study commissioned by the U.S. Office of Education on the impacts of financial aid programs on choice and access indicate that students, and minority students in particular, are very conscious of college costs (Astin, Henson, and Christian 1978). Although minority students like other students may initially prefer to attend expensive universities and private institutions, they are generally less successful in doing so, partly because the student's self-assessment of his or her family's financial resources can restrict the student's perceived choices. Distance from the student's home to preferred institution(s) also works against the low-income and minority student: The greater the distance, the more likely it is that the student will enter a low-cost public institution closer to home. And students are sensitive to the size of grants and the overall amount of aid offered: The larger the grant or amount of overall aid, the greater the likelihood the student will matriculate at the institution making the larger offer.

Financial aid policies also affect persistence. The size of a student's loan obligation is negatively related to persistence: The larger the loan, the less likely the student is to remain in school. The form of the aid is very important for minority students: Work-study jobs, part-time on-campus employment, large grant support, and small loan obligations all contribute to increased persistence among minority students, across all minority groups (Astin, Cross, and Porter 1979; Astin 1977b; Astin 1982). The impact of financial aid on minority students' persistence is so pronounced that despite the extent to which government financial aid policies are designed to aid disadvantaged students, "these programs have still fallen short of their goal" (Astin 1982, p. 94; see also Commission on the Higher Education of Minorities 1982, pp. 30–31).

Interventions for Access and Persistence

Four major federal programs constitute a series of implicitly linked interventions designed to address the nonfinancial barriers to college attendance: *Educational Opportunity Centers* (EOCs) provide financial and academic counseling and related services in low-income areas to assist potential college students; *Talent Search* (TS) outreach programs attempt to identify financially and/or culturally disadvantaged "high potential"

students and encourage them to complete high school and enter college; *Upward Bound* (UB) programs for junior high and high school students seek to build and further develop academic skills and motivation to overcome the effects of prior inadequate schooling; and *Special Services for Disadvantaged Students* (SSDS) programs provide personal and academic counseling, tutoring, and other related services to disadvantaged and handicapped college students to improve academic performance and encourage persistence. Although they share common goals, these programs are not marked by the use of a specific or particular uniform approach.

These educational intervention programs have four common features:

1. *Implied deficit model*: Differences in attainment and achievement are explained by an implicit deficit model. The absence of role models and educational and cultural opportunities, and the presence of financial disadvantage explain differences in achievement and attainment.
2. *Support for educational services*: Programs provide a similar set of interventions, generally tutoring, counseling, and cultural enrichment.
3. *Assistance for the disadvantaged*: Intended program participants are the "disadvantaged," generally a euphemism for minority students.
4. *Focus on the development of academic skills*: The major thrust of these programs is the development of academic skills, particularly basic skills. These programs address both remedial skills and enrichment and attempt to improve academic skills so as to facilitate future educational attainment (Tinto and Sherman 1974).

A fifth common feature of these intervention programs—like many college programs—is their *uncertain technology* (Cohen and March 1973). They often lack a clear and tested concept upon which a strategy of intervention might be based and instead operate on a trial-and-error basis. Interventions encompass a range of activities and purposes. The "software" may not be well developed; some approaches are context- or population-specific. The deficit model inherent in the conceptualization of these programs defines certain programmatic responses, generally dependent on the mobilization of resources and enrichment.

In the past 10 years, federal, state, and institutional campus-based assistance and outreach programs for disadvantaged or "high-risk" students have proliferated. Eighty-six percent of the nation's public institutions offer some sort of special services or programs for disadvantaged students:

> *Specifically, 95 percent of the [public] community colleges and 77 percent of the [public] senior colleges are providing a special service such as tutoring, counseling, and/or financial aid. In only four years [since the Davis et al. (1975) survey of special programs] we find a nearly 40 percent increase in special services for the academically disadvantaged student in higher education (Roueche and Snow 1977, p. 19).*

A large but undetermined number of private institutions also offer such programs.

Regardless of their source of funds (federal, state, institution, or private), special programs for the disadvantaged are closely identified with minority interests and the goal of increased participation by minorities in higher education. These programs have ambitious goals and objectives: increased rates of college access, improved academic performance, and better rates of persistence and degree completion. They generally are effective.

Access to higher education. One common objective of the Upward Bound and Talent Search programs and of EOCs is to encourage disadvantaged students to complete high school and to assist students to enter postsecondary training and educational programs. The services that might facilitate access are broadly defined, for example, personal and academic counseling, enrichment and remediation programs, financial aid counseling, and college counseling and placement assistance. While the quality of evaluation materials is very erratic, ranging from program reports to commissioned longitudinal studies, in general the literature suggests that these programs and other similar nonfederally funded efforts do indeed positively affect minority students' access to higher education.

The most encouraging and seemingly reliable reports of positive impacts are found in the comparative longitudinal studies of the Upward Bound program commissioned by USOE and begun in 1973 by Burkheimer and his associates (1976; 1977; 1980). These studies reveal a number of positive impacts of the UB programs on college access:

- UB participants enter postsecondary education at significantly higher rates than nonparticipants. Roughly 20 percent more participants enter some form of postsecondary education.
- Former UB participants are more likely to enter four-year colleges and universities than their nonparticipating counterparts. Two-thirds of the former group versus one-half of the latter group matriculated at four-year institutions.
- Proportionately more participants apply for financial aid; additionally, the aid packages offered former participants contained larger grants and were perceived by the students to be more adequate than the offers of aid received by nonparticipants.
- UB participants who do not matriculate immediately following high school graduation are more likely to do so at a later date than are comparable nonparticipants.
- UB minority participants are more likely to attend college than are their nonparticipating peers.
- Increased participation in the program is associated with greater access to postsecondary education. One year of program participation has a slight impact on access, while two or more years has a significant positive impact.

- Although UB projects differ in range of project activities and types of clientele, these differences do not affect the overall effectiveness of the project, provided clients' characteristics have been controlled for in the analyses.

The results of these studies document an impressive set of achievements for the Upward Bound program. In their most recent evaluation, Burkheimer and his colleagues conclude that Upward Bound does have a significant positive impact on students' access to postsecondary education:

> *The results . . . offer rather consistent support for the general conclusion that the [Upward Bound] program is effectively meeting its mandated objectives to provide participants with the skills and motivations necessary for entry and success in education beyond high school. Program impact is greatest on short-term outcomes, and evidence that [Upward Bound] is providing the skills, motivation, and assistance necessary for entry into [postsecondary education] is substantial. . . . While it is impossible to state definitively that the greater aspirations, [educational] expectations, and [postsecondary education] entry rates [reported in our studies] were brought about (or caused) by [students'] exposure to the program, this appears to be the most likely conclusion. The pattern of results obtained is closely aligned with what would be expected in view of the common areas of program emphasis and intervention strategies (Burkheimer et al. 1980, p. 133).*

The USOE summary of program reports submitted by various EOCs and Talent Search projects suggests that these programs also have positive impacts on access to college, but the evidence is not as dramatic or as reliable as the evidence gathered for the Upward Bound program. Reports submitted to USOE for project year 1976–77 indicate that EOCs served some 50,000 clients, nearly half of them minorities. As the centers offer services to citizens in low-income communities, eligibility is tied to residence, not to personal characteristics of individual clients. USOE does not report data regarding the percentage of clients placed in postsecondary training or educational institutions, although it does indicate that in project year 1976–77 some 16,000 clients were placed in postsecondary or other types of training programs and that another 5,000-plus clients had been accepted by postsecondary institutions but had yet to begin their studies.

Because of its broad legislative charge, the Talent Search program can draw upon a potential client population of over 4 million people: all people aged 14–27 whose highest academic grade is between grades 6 and 12 and whose family income is below poverty level, as well as youths from other than low-income families, provided their numbers do not exceed one-third of project participants (USOE 1979). Given the ambiguity of the authorizing legislation, it is difficult to determine whether program objectives are being realized:

The authorizing legislation for the Talent Search Program, and the program regulations, use several terms to describe the target population and goals for the program. Such critical terms or phrases as "cultural need," "exceptional potential," and "demonstrated aptitude" are difficult to define. Inadequate definition may cause wide and conflicting interpretation of the target population, and the lack of specificity makes it difficult to measure the attainment of program objectives (USOE 1979, p. 294).

In the same report, USOE presents some summary data from project reports and from one national study that suggest that Talent Search programs do have positive impacts on students' access to higher education. However, the single commissioned study of the Talent Search program was a descriptive one based on interviews with students, site visits, and a review of program files and did not include a comparison or control group. Consequently:

an assessment of the program's impact on high school retention and college entrance cannot be done. Consequently, it cannot be asserted, based on the [one descriptive] study [Pycha et al. 1975], that the program does or does not place students in college who would have enrolled in college without the program's services (USOE 1979, p. 299).

Additionally, the Pycha study observed some other problems with the Talent Search program. It was impossible to identify a common or typical project, given the range of program foci and services in the individual projects; projects occasionally supplanted rather than supplemented the counseling services offered in local high schools; and the programs were more successful servicing the needs of the motivated who might seek out counseling and assistance than tapping the unmotivated but capable who might benefit from the project's services.

In sum, it appears that the TRIO programs do contribute to improved access for minorities to postsecondary education and that the Upward Bound program has been a particularly effective program.

Persistence. The UB and SSDS programs attempt to encourage persistence in postsecondary education. Upward Bound attempts to generate the skills and motivation necessary for success in postsecondary education; SSDS programs provide a range of services for eligible students to help them continue their studies and eventually to complete a degree program. The results of external evaluations of both these programs suggest that they do contribute to increased persistence among program participants.

The longitudinal studies of UB participants report rates of persistence in terms of students' educational goals. Persistence is assessed in terms of the individual student's progress "as a percentage of the total progress necessary to reach the individual's reported educational aspirations" (Burkheimer et al. 1980, p. 51). The UB follow-up study indicates that former UB participants make more progress toward their reported educational

goals (i.e., the level of degree sought, not necessarily in the specific field) than do nonparticipants, although the differences are not consistently statistically significant. The same study reports that among students who initially matriculated at two-year institutions, former UB participants are slightly (but not significantly) more likely to transfer into a four-year institution. Additionally, former UB participants are much more likely than nonparticipants to attend postsecondary institutions that serve as UB and/or SSDS host institutions. This factor of itself could contribute to increased rates of persistence, especially if the student has had some experience on a particular college campus as a UB student, is somewhat familiar with it, and perceives the institution to be a hospitable place interested in his or her experiences and overall educational and personal development.

Davis et al. (1975) report that "there is no clear and consistent evidence that the availability and/or use of [SSDS] is related to the [college] success or satisfaction of the disadvantaged student" (p. vi). The results of their study, the first major assessment of SSDS programs, suggest that the presence of SSDS programs on individual college campuses appears to be associated with changing attitudes on campus; these programs contribute to the general acceptance of disadvantaged students by faculty and administrators, thus contributing to the development of a more receptive campus environment. Although these changes may not be directly linked to performance and persistence, campus ambiance is certainly a factor that does affect those outcomes. Similar results are reported in the preliminary analysis of a more current SSDS evaluation (System Development Corporation 1981).

Academic impacts. One specific objective of the TRIO programs is to improve academic performance. Early reviews of the literature suggested that this goal might be the most difficult to fulfill:

> *[One] should not expect miracles from compensatory education and must learn to support it for what it can do—it can reduce the penalties of disadvantaged background and enhance social justice, but it cannot, by itself, secure it (Etzioni 1969, p. 15).*
>
> *No piece of evidence with which I am familiar supports the notion that by putting disadvantaged students through a few courses, seminars, weekend workshops, or summer sessions, one can remedy the effects of . . . the four or five years that separate disadvantaged students from their [more] academically prepared classmates. . . . The main conclusion from the same body of literature points to the need for reaching the disadvantaged student as early in his career as possible. (Etzioni 1971, p. 115).*

Subsequent reviews and evaluations are no more encouraging. Academic performance is identified as a major disappointment or failing of the UB and SSDS programs. Remediation and special programming are not the quick fix for the academic difficulties and poor academic prepa-

ration of many minority students. This is not to say, however, that UB, SSDS, and the other efforts do not have positive impacts on program participants and their access to or persistence in higher education. Indeed, improved persistence is one aspect of improved academic performance. Rather, it is to say that these efforts alone cannot close the gap in college-level academic skills and performance that often separate minority students from their peers.

The evaluations of UB and SSDS programs commissioned by the U.S. Office of Education indicate that these programs generally have little impact on academic performance and long-term academic achievement (Tinto and Sherman 1974; Davis et al. 1975; Burkheimer et al. 1977; Burkheimer et al. 1980). With regard to the SSDS programs, "there is no evidence that the [participating] institutions or any support services available are providing disadvantaged students experiences that would help them raise their prior levels of [academic] performance" (Davis et al. 1975, p. 10), and *"there is no clear and consistent evidence that the availability and/or use of Special Services programs is related to the success or satisfaction of the disadvantaged student"* (p. vi). While SDSS programs are indeed effective in other areas, they do not appear to improve academic performance.

> *Although substantial positive changes occurred among recipients of these services in attitudes, values, and motivation, there was little indication of impact of the services on the academic achievement of the target population. Disadvantaged students did not reduce the gap in college grade point average between themselves and the regularly admitted (modal) students, differences between high school and college grades for the two groups remaining approximately the same. The college environment, while not tending to magnify previous differences in academic achievement, does not appear to be compensating for such differences. Overall, the academic success of disadvantaged students at institutions with Special Services Programs was no greater, and no less, than at colleges without such programs. This outcome was not affected by the differential emphasis upon specific programmatic elements, such as tutoring or counseling. There was no evidence that the colleges these students were in, or any support services available to them, were helping the students to exceed the level of [academic] performance that would be expected of them in college, given their level of performance in high school (USOE 1979, pp. 306–7)*

The preliminary results of a more recent assessment of the SSDS program reveal similar findings, i.e., little if any impact on academic achievement although generally positive effects on persistence, a secondary measure of achievement (System Development Corporation 1981).

Similar results are reported for the academic impacts of the Upward Bound program, which is legislatively charged "to generate skills and motivation necessary for success in education beyond high school" (Higher Education Act of 1965, as amended, 417B(b)(2)). An early study of the

Upward Bound Program (Hunt and Hardt 1967, cited by Levitan 1969) concluded that the program did appear to increase students' motivation to attend and complete college but offered a cautious qualifying statement about the as-yet undetermined long-term academic impacts of participation in the program. Impact of the program was often exaggerated and overstated, particularly in the area of educational progress and persistence (U.S. General Accounting Office 1974). Studies commissioned by USOE of the impacts of the UB program reveal a number of significant impacts but fail to document positive effects on cognitive academic achievement (Burkheimer et al. 1977). The most recent evaluation, a comparative longitudinal assessment of program participants and nonparticipants concludes that Upward Bound has little impact on academic development, although it does improve various skills needed for persistence:

> *There is no evidence that academic skills accrue to any greater extent by participation in [Upward Bound], since no differential change in high school GPA as a function of program participation was found [in the base year study] and little, if any, systematic unique relationship between typical measures of [postsecondary] progress, persistence, and performance and extent or pattern of [Upward Bound] participation is indicated [in the two follow-up studies]. Given the limited instructional time available to projects, clear-cut impact on academic skills may be an unrealistic expectation. On the other hand, the results do suggest that program participants benefit from sharpened coping or survival skills (Burkheimer et al. 1980, p. 134).*

In sum, the UB and SSDS programs, while successful in the areas of access and persistence, generally have not been successful in closing the gap in academic performance that often separates disadvantaged students from their college classmates. Perhaps improved academic performance is an unrealistic goal for these programs, espoused in earlier, possibly more naive or optimistic, times when educators and policy makers assumed that any domestic problem could be resolved by the application of money. Too, perhaps the software and the interventions used in these programs are not adequately developed; the absence of a theoretical model for these programs and their trial-and-error evaluation perhaps has impeded the development of intervention strategies that might positively affect the academic performance of program participants. Or perhaps it is time to lay to rest the expectation that compensatory education and special programs can provide the quick fix for the cumulative effects of poor schooling and inadequate academic preparation.

Institutional Support: The Title III Program

The Title III program of the Higher Education Act of 1965 as amended is the largest institutional aid program in the federal higher education budget. The program is closely allied to and identified with minority interests, particularly those of the nation's historically black colleges. The program

has been embroiled in controversy for a number of years, in part because several evaluations have questioned both its purpose and effectiveness.

The history of the Title III program embodies probably the best and the worst aspects of any federal program—strong on aspirations and short on administration and implementation. The program is an "object lesson in the perils of direct federal entanglement with institutional support" (Breneman and Nelson 1980, p. 243). Others are more critical:

> *The Strengthening Developing Institutions Program is beset with many problems. Basic to each problem is that the program lacks direction. Neither the Congress [by means of legislation] nor HEW [by means of administrative rules] has defined the intent of the program in such a way that its progress in meeting its goals can be measured. After 12 years and more than $728 million in grant awards, fundamental questions are largely unanswered (U.S. General Accounting Office 1979, p. 8).*

And Congress has addressed the controversy about Title III:

> *No other higher education program has received as much attention regarding its intent as has Title III. The controversy surrounding this program focuses not only on the question of purpose but on the manner in which the Office of Education has administered it. . . . No one argues with the fact that the program lacks purpose and direction and that no administration in the past fourteen years has been successful in dealing with the management problems that have resulted in arbitrary methods of awarding grants and poor accounting procedures by both grantees and the Office of Education (U.S. Congress 1979, p. 12).*

Despite the problems associated with Title III, it remains a popular program and a politically sensitive one as well. From its inception, the program has been closely linked to the nation's historically black colleges (Cobb 1977; Kahn 1977; National Advisory Committee 1979b; Player 1967). Five administrations—from Johnson to Reagan—have supported and expanded the program, in part perhaps because it is a visible way to demonstrate presidential support for the education of blacks. Legislative amendments in early years of the program linked Title III to the interests of Hispanics and American Indians as well.

The Title III program suffers from a number of problems and display the characteristics of an organizational anarchy (see Cohen and March 1973). Those specific characteristics include problems in defining goals, uncertain technology, and fluid boundaries.

- *Unclear goals*: The legislation offers a variety of ill-defined and unclear preferences. Congressional intent has been masked behind vague and ambiguous language that does not clearly define either specific program activities or the potential or intended program participants. Specific details regarding program management have been delegated

to an administrative agency that is often no more specific about program participation and activities than is the authorizing legislation. The ambiguous language and unclear intent lead to disputes among evaluators and program officials and various groups of program constituencies and participants.

- *Uncertain technology*: The program and, consequently, institutional activities often lack a clear and tested concept upon which to base a strategy of intervention. The individual programs operate on a trial-and-error basis. The "software" is neither well developed nor easily assessed.
- *Fluid boundaries*: Participants vary from one year to the next, and the boundaries of the program appear to be uncertain and changing. Symbols and politics affect participation in the program, and specific issues are determined by a range of internal and external dimensions.

Several issues dominate any discussion about the Title III program: What are the goals of the program, and how did these goals evolve? Is it an important program, and if so to whom? Has it been a successful program, and if so how?

Goals of the Program. For 15 years, until the Education Amendments of 1980, the legislation never clearly defined the specific goals of the Title III program other than to say that it exists to "strengthen the academic quality of developing institutions" (sec. 301). The criteria for eligibility never clearly defined the intended beneficiaries of the program. Instead, accreditation was used as the primary attribute of potentially eligible institutions. The much-criticized administrative criteria for eligibility "have created an illusion of precision" in determining which institutions are eligible (Kahn 1977, p. 2).

Most authorities agree, however, that the nation's historically black colleges were the primary intended beneficiaries of the program (Player 1967; Finn 1978; Cobb 1977; Fincher 1980; Breneman and Nelson 1980; National Advisory Committee 1979b). A combination of events—including but not limited to Earl McGrath's 1965 study of historically black colleges, the House Education Subcommittee Chair Edith Green's interests in both black colleges and in consortia arrangements, and the growing civil rights movement—all helped to bring the program to the fore. McGrath in particular is emphatic and unambiguous in his recommendation that black institutions should get some sort of federal aid:

> *. . . the Federal Government must assume a major and inescapable role [in providing financial support to these institutions], for the Negro colleges are chiefly located in the most economically disadvantaged states of the union. As the President of the United States has made abundantly clear, education is a national problem and hence a Federal responsibility. Poor education is a reflection on our national values. The provision of equal opportunities for higher education on a national basis will require massive*

Federal action and support, and the [black colleges] must be its earliest and relatively largest beneficiaries if the present racial inequities are to be forever eradicated from our national life (McGrath 1965, p. 168).

It seems clear that Congress somewhat simplistically intended this program to end once participating institutions entered the mainstream of academic life. This view is further supported by the subsequent division of the program into two project areas, basic grants and advanced grants, the latter a one-time, five-year award. The five-year limit on the duration of the now discontinued advanced grants program seemed to imply that institutions would "graduate" from the program. Unfortunately, Congress never specified the graduation requirements, and the issue was never seriously discussed until the first recipients of advanced grants approached their final year of funding. Although the legislation probably was not intended to provide a continuing source of institutional support many participating institutions have come to depend on Title III funds as an important source of operating revenue, in a manner perhaps analogous to research universities' dependence on the overhead generated by federal research grants (Breneman and Nelson 1980; Finn 1978).

Importance of the Program. The significance of any federal program is determined by symbols and substance, rhetoric and dollars. The growth of the Title III program is one indication of its importance: No federal program experiences a 400-percent increase in annual appropriations over the course of a decade without at least one influential and active constituency. The direction of Title III aid toward "a group of institutions which in the past had little or no chance of receiving support from federal or from private benefactors of higher education" (Player 1967, p. 7) helps to explain the popularity of the program among black and white institutions, particularly small private colleges. The number of institutions potentially eligible to participate in the Title III program under the former "struggling and developing" criteria approaches nearly one-third of all colleges and universities (Kahn 1977). For those potentially eligible institutions that do receive Title III funding, the program is indeed important. Annual reports from Title III assisting agencies stress the importance of these grants and their contribution to institutional management and planning (see, for example, McMannis Associates 1978). The "program has been a tremendous boost to developing institutions in helping to overcome handicaps and develop programs and services necessary to provide a quality education to their student bodies" (National Advisory Committee 1979b, p. 61). The presidents of black colleges that receive Title III funds report program benefits in the areas of planning and curriculum development (Fincher 1980). In sum, the beneficiaries as well as observers report that the program is indeed important.

Success of the Program. Assessing the program's effectiveness remains a more difficult task. A series of reports and evaluations have questioned

the effectiveness of the Title III program. Studies by the U.S. General Accounting Office (1974; 1979) focus on administrative problems centered in the U.S. Office of Education and on managerial problems involving some Title III grantees and their assisting agencies. The GAO studies chastise USOE officials on a number of counts for poor program management and leadership, an opinion echoed in a USOE-commissioned review of the program (Cobb 1977). Evaluations conducted for USOE raise questions about the overall impact of Title III grants on institutional development and improvement (Miller et al. 1969; Hodgkinson and Schenkel 1974; Weathersby et al. 1977).

While the GAO reports and commissioned studies question the overall effectiveness of the Title III program, grant recipients, their representatives, and their supporters are unequivocal in their support for this program; participating and potentially eligible institutions want, and perhaps more importantly feel they need, Title III assistance to help sustain their institutions, to improve curricula and administration, and to continue serving their often low-income, disadvantaged, and poorly prepared students. Recipients' perceptions and assessments of the impact and effectiveness of grants unfortunately are not the kind of data that lend themselves to the much desired yet seemingly elusive "quantitative data" that might document institutional "advancement," "development," and "qualitative improvement."

Good reasons exist for retiring the whole concept of institutional development, at least as it has been applied to the Title III program. For one, patterns of funding suggest that a number of "developed" institutions have received Title III aid in recent years. Additionally, the concept is difficult to define, let alone assess. Elaborate rationales have been proposed to support and document developmental schemes for postsecondary institutions (see Hodgkinson and Schenkel 1974; St. John and Weathersby 1977; Weathersby et al. 1977). Yet a close reading of the legislative history of the Title III program, and particularly the statements of officials of the Johnson administration, suggests that these rationales have been ex post facto attempts to legitimize a legislative compromise (see Gruson 1978, pp. 32–37; Jacobs and Tingley 1977; Cobb 1977; Fincher 1980). Gruson (1978) offers a candid explanation for the congressional linguistic compromise that eventually substituted the notion of "developing institution" into the 1965 legislation even though ample evidence documented the Johnson administration's intent to aid historically black colleges. Administration officials were concerned that any specific reference to black colleges as intended beneficiaries would run afoul of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a contention recently resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court's 1980 *Fullilove* decision* and by provisions of the Education Amendments of 1980, which establish a funding base for the historically black college.

*In *Fullilove v. Klutznick* (100 S.C. 2758) the Supreme Court found that it was not unconstitutional for the Public Works Employment Act to include a 10 percent setaside for minority-owned small businesses.

Title III can help black institutions attain "a baseline of excellence and viability" (National Advisory Committee 1979b, pp. 62–63) because the limited resources of black institutions make it difficult for them "to compete for funds and grants with mainstream institutions" (p. 64). Comparative data about revenues and expenditures reveal that federal (and no doubt significant private) aid does help black institutions maintain their "baseline of viability."*

Table 8 presents data on mean resources and expenditures per FTE student for AY 1977–78. The black colleges generally receive more government appropriations than similar white colleges located in the same region (according to their Carnegie type). The significance of federal aid to black colleges is reflected in their greater federal appropriations (e.g., Title III funds and student financial aid), although the black four-year colleges also receive more state aid per student than other colleges in the southern states. Public black four-year colleges averaged roughly 8 percent more government revenues during AY 1977–78, while private black four-year colleges averaged roughly 50 percent more government dollars than their regional counterparts. Clearly, federal dollars are an important source of "baseline" revenue for black colleges, more so than for other similar institutions. State aid, both general appropriation dollars and student financial assistance, is also important for these institutions. Of course, government funds help offset the generally lower tuition charges in black colleges (see the reported values for subsidy in Table 8).

The data on expenditures in Table 8 also reveal that black colleges are holding their own when compared to similar institutions. Educational and general (E&G) expenditures, generally acknowledged to be the best measure of an institution's investment in its students, are greater in the black four-year colleges. To some degree, the higher E&G expenditures reflect the additional, if often hidden, costs of remedial programs and instruction more common in black institutions. Public four-year black colleges report E&G expenditures much higher than the regional and the national means, 32.4 and 11.5 percent respectively; private black four-year colleges also report the highest E&G expenditure for institutions in the same category. The black two-year colleges, both public and private, report E&G expenditures slightly below the regional and national means.

The traditional low-income clientele of black colleges is reflected in the figures for financial aid and educational subsidy. Per student financial aid is much greater in the black colleges: Public black colleges award more than three times the aid per student than do other similar colleges in the South. In the private four-year colleges, the mean difference in financial aid is $297, or 58 percent. Educational subsidy is also much

*One reviewer expressed concern about the reference to private aid in this section of the manuscript. Although the black colleges generally receive little financial support from their alumni (compared to other institutions), these institutions (as a group) do receive substantial financial support from private foundations, business, and industry.

Table 8: Educational Resources by Type of Institution in Academic Year 1977–78
(Mean Dollars per FTE Student[a])

Resource	Public Four-Year Colleges			Private Four-Year Colleges			Public Two-Year Colleges			Private Two-Year Colleges		
	All Colleges (379)	White Southern Colleges (88)	Black[b] Southern Colleges (25)	All Colleges (881)	White Southern Colleges (158)	Black[b] Southern Colleges (39)	All Colleges (113)	White Southern Colleges (209)	Black[b] Southern Colleges (9)	All Colleges (244)	White Southern Colleges (56)	Black[b] Southern Colleges (12)
Government appropriations												
Federal	$ 42	$ 4	$ 101	$ 68	$ 20	$ 132	$ 76	$ 33	$ 56	$ 17	$ 15	$ 76
State	2,046	1,870	1,923	32	14	39	1,502	1,810	1,435	31	53	0
Local	87	6	4	0	0	0	557	133	146	3	0	0
Total	2,175	1,880	2,028	100	34	171	2,135	1,976	1,637	51	68	76
Expenditures												
Educational and general purposes	3,250	2,737	3,625	4,160	3,978	4,327	2,909	2,682	2,624	2,900	2,971	2,782
Instruction	1,486	1,321	1,400	1,492	1,371	1,338	1,463	1,349	1,191	979	998	734
Libraries	150	140	142	164	177	141	110	118	110	105	111	135
Funded research	90	59	172	72	105	52	6	4	28	4	3	3
Financial aid[c]	149	89	313	456	415	712	71	61	100	183	242	125
Student services	227	177	255	358	359	391	233	211	223	286	298	304
Subsidy[d]	2,752	2,267	3,395	2,197	2,296	3,329	2,473	2,337	2,351	1,319	1,684	1,948
Endowment	129	107	22	3,570	4,572	2,029	87	6	0	1,399	2,896	187

[a]The greater cost of graduate and professional education was discounted by weighting each graduate or professional student by a factor of 3.0.

[b]Black colleges are those institutions classified as being historically or predominantly black by the National Center for Education Statistics.

[c]Includes government aid awarded by the institution (e.g., NDSL, work-study funds) but not funds awarded directly to students by the government (e.g., Pell Grants).

[d]Educational and general expenditures plus financial aid minus tuition.

Source: Higher Education General Information Survey, National Center for Education Statistics, 1978. Analysis by the author.

higher in black four-year colleges: The overall mean difference in subsidy is 33 percent in the public sector and 31 percent, or $1,033, in the private sector. These figures reveal the importance of federal aid to the black colleges, the largest Title III constituency. The data document the role of government funding, which helps to maintain the baseline of viability and institutional resources.

If Title III is to be a program of continuing institutional assistance—as many argue it has been and should be—then the legislation should describe explicitly the intended beneficiaries, goals, and objectives of the program. The legislative amendments of 1980 are a first step in this direction in that they cite minority institutions generally and black colleges specifically as intended beneficiaries. Yet the legislation is still full of ambiguous eligibility requirements and uncertain intent, in part reflecting the diverse constituency of the program, perhaps as large as one-third of the nation's colleges and universities. Institutional aid may well be an appropriate part of the federal policy agenda, particularly if tied to the issue of access and educational opportunity; if so, then it should be clear and unambiguous.

Summary and Conclusions

The empirical evidence suggests that the major federal categorical programs designed to assist minority students and minority institutions do have generally positive impacts and benefits. The evidence also suggests, however, that many of these programs have fallen far short of their espoused goals and objectives. *Financial aid* programs improve access, but the issue of choice—perhaps more important in determining impacts and outcomes—is not fully resolved. Moreover, given the lower rates of persistence of students receiving financial aid, it is clear that these programs do not completely eliminate the obstacles low-income students experience in pursuit of a college degree. *Special programs for access and persistence* do improve access to higher education and appear to have some positive impacts on persistence. Yet these programs fall short of their stated goal of improving academic performance. *Institutional aid* remains controversial, subject to competing claims and pressures from interest groups, and accompanied by a series of evaluations identifying organizational problems in the program. The need for such assistance is evident, however, and five presidents have publicly pledged support for this program.

These programs and others have had a major effect on minorities' access to and participation in higher education over the past decade. Clearly, federal leadership and funding have affected a wide range of state and institutional practices and policies. It is clear, however, that many of these programs, while experiencing some important successes, have fallen far short of their espoused goals and objectives. The challenge for federal and state policy makers in the coming decade will be to recognize the limits of government programs and then to identify programs and develop interventions that are long on impact and short on rhetoric.

Policy Issues for the 1980s

In broad terms, the state and federal legislative agendas for the postwar development of American higher education are essentially complete (Breneman and Nelson 1980). The state agenda, reflected in the level of state support for the expansion of public colleges and universities during the past three decades, has placed postsecondary education within geographic access of virtually all citizens. The ambitious federal agenda, first articulated in the Higher Education Act of 1965 as amended, has emphasized reducing the financial and nonfinancial barriers affecting college attendance. State and federal efforts have created a system of higher education unrivaled among the nations of the world and marked by an array of institutional diversity and the highest levels of citizen participation in postsecondary education. The existing range of state and federal programs addresses the diverse national objectives for American higher education first identified a decade ago:

> *. . . support for research in areas of national interest; equal access to postsecondary education for low income and other educationally disadvantaged students; strengthening collegiate institutions in certain functions; work-force training to increase the supply of skilled persons in critical occupations and to expand employment opportunities for unskilled persons; and special benefits for certain classes of persons, such as veterans, survivors of Social Security beneficiaries, and the handicapped and disabled persons (National Commission 1973, p. 106).*

The past 15 years have also seen the states and the federal government develop distinct roles in postsecondary education. "The states have frequently functioned as educational entrepreneurs, financiers, and planners, [while] the federal government has primarily been a purchaser of services (for example, research) and, through its student aid program, has encouraged others to become consumers of higher education" (Carnegie Commission 1972, p. 39). Although the states and the federal government share a common goal of increasing access to and participation in postsecondary education, they have taken different routes in their efforts to address these issues. The states have focused on the general capacity for access and participation, assuming a brick and mortar approach that has yielded more institutions and more degree programs. In contrast, the federal government has focused on participation by individuals; since 1965, federal policies have been increasingly concerned with underwriting the individual's costs of access and participation.

Despite the espoused similarity of goals, underlying tensions are apparent in the relationship between Washington and the state governments: Disputes have often centered on state policies, programs, or practices perceived to be detrimental to minority groups' interests. The history of minorities' quest for equal educational opportunity has often led to confrontation between the states and the federal government. The history of the past two decades shows "an uneasy relationship between federal purpose and state performance" (Keppel 1980, p. 149). Litigation is a frequent

form of redress. In simplistic terms, the drama has often played a benevolent federal government against recalcitrant states: Washington has been the enforcer, wielding both carrot and stick to ensure states' compliance with court orders and legislative edicts.

The Reagan Revolution

What then of the government's support for higher education during the 1980s? The Reagan Revolution begun in January 1981 will have a major impact on government social programs and the various roles of state and federal government in higher education. The proposed and already implemented cuts in federal programs come at a time when most states cannot afford to assume the costs of additional social programs. Moreover, these reductions occur during a period of major demographic shifts: Although the *number* of minority youths in the college-aged cohort will remain relatively stable, the *proportion* of minorities in the age cohort will rise from 14 percent to roughly 20 percent (see Frances 1980a, p. 52; Baldridge, Kemerer, and Green 1982, Chapter 2).

Since assuming office in January 1981, the Reagan administration has initiated dramatic cuts in the federal budget, largely in social programs. The president's budget proposals, if fully enacted by Congress, would reduce constant dollar federal expenditures for education by nearly 60 percent between FY 1981 and FY 1985, from $17.4 billion to $7.3 billion. Proposed reductions for postsecondary programs during the same period would total $6.3 billion (again, nearly 60 percent) (see Aaron et al. 1982, p. 137). Although federal funding for postsecondary education through the U.S. Department of Education was not marked by the array of categorical programs that lent themselves to reductions and reorganization into block grants (as was the case for elementary and secondary education programs), the administration has identified a number of postsecondary programs for major reductions or elimination. Consistent with their efforts to control all entitlement programs, the Reagan forces focused on the student financial aid programs, establishing an agenda that if fully implemented would effectively repeal the Middle Income Student Assistance Act of 1978 (MISSA) and significantly cut other financial aid programs.

Some of these budget cuts are probably long overdue, the most obvious being financial aid to middle-income students. The generous aid extended to middle-income families by the 1978 MISSA was the result of a political compromise, not a bold new policy initiative. The Carter administration struck a bargain with the growing number of supporters of tuition tax credits. Consequently, large numbers of middle- and upper-income students were eligible for aid previously restricted to low-income families. The Carter administration's last budget proposals included recommendations to reduce aid for middle-income students; seen in this context, the Reagan cuts in financial aid programs are in one sense a continuation of a policy initiated by a departing administration concerned about controlling the budget.

There is no doubt, however, that the Reagan administration has its

own policy agenda for postsecondary education, which extends far beyond the budget cuts initially proposed during the closing days of the Carter administration (Table 9). The administration's recommendations for the 1983 budget would cut the number and the size of Pell Grants, eliminate two campus-based aid programs, terminate some categorical and intervention programs, and eliminate federal fellowship funds for women and minorities (see Executive Office of the President 1982, pp. 5-112–5-114; Aaron and Associates 1982, pp. 142–46). Despite the fact that many of these programs serve special groups (often minorities), the administration feels that these cuts pose no major threat to access and participation as former participants "are eligible for assistance under other higher education programs" (Executive Office of the President 1982, p. 5-115).

The impact of the administration's cuts in the financial aid program is quite clear. Despite its arguments to the contrary, these cuts will have a major impact on students' access to postsecondary education. Cuts in the Pell Grant program will reduce the number of students aided from 2.7 million in 1981 to 1.8 million in 1983 (Table 9). Granted, as the administration argues, many of the students no longer eligible for these grants will be from middle-income families with incomes over $20,000. Students from the poorest families, however, will find their grants reduced, as the maximum grant declines from $1,800 in 1980 to $1,600 in 1983 to perhaps as low as $1,000 in later years (O'Neill and Simms 1982, p. 355). Moreover, the real dollar value of these grants will have declined by approximately 50 percent since the first Pell Grants (then called Basic Educational Opportunity Grants) were awarded in 1974.

> *When the [Pell Grant] program was first created in 1972, the maximum grant was $1,400; after adjustment for inflation, the value of the $1,600 maximum award proposed for 1983 is half that initial award. With the average cost of college currently at $5,500, even the maximum Pell grant available to the neediest students covers less than 30 percent of [the] direct costs [of attending college] (Aaron et al. 1982, p. 144).*

The programmatic impacts of these changes in policy and programs, in higher education and elsewhere, reflect a "retreat from egalitarian values that had attracted growing and often bipartisan support over the past twenty years" (Falmer and Sawhill 1982, p. 26). Moreover, human resource programs—those intended to develop and enhance individual skills and national talent such as the Graduate and Professional Opportunities Program—have suffered extensive budget cuts during the early years of the Reagan administration, further affecting minority students' participation in postsecondary education.

Although most postsecondary programs have suffered or been targets of extensive cutbacks under the Reagan budgets, one program actually received additional funding. The administration's 1983 budget proposes an increase of $10 million for institutional support, noting that "the administration has been particularly concerned with the level of [govern-

Table 9: Federal Budget Authority for Higher Education in Constant 1981 Dollars and Number of Students Aided in Selected Fiscal Years, 1981–1985

Item	1981	1982	1983	1985
Budget authority (billions of dollars)				
Pell Grants	2.3	2.1	1.2	0.8
Supplementary Educational Opportunity Grants	0.4	0.3	0.0	0.0
National Defense Student Loans	0.2	0.2	0.0	0.0
College Work-Study Program	0.6	0.5	0.4	0.3
State Student Incentive Grants	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0
Guaranteed student loans	2.5	2.6	2.2	2.0
Health training	0.7	0.4	0.3	0.3
General institutional assistance and other	0.6	0.5	0.4	0.4
Social Security	1.9	1.3	0.7	0.1
GI Bill benefits	1.5	1.1	0.9	0.5
Total	10.7	9.1	6.0	4.4
Students aided (thousands)				
Pell Grants	2,770	2,400	1,800	*
Supplementary Educational Opportunity Grants	615	463	0	0
National Defense Student Loans	266	256	0	0
College Work-Study Program	916	880	666	*
State Student Incentive Grants	300	296	0	0
Guaranteed student loans	3,500	2,900	2,800	*
Parent loans	0	943	1,400	*
Social Security	590	610	316	50
GI Bill benefits	681	585	492	331

*Not applicable.

Source: Aaron et al. 1982, Table 4.8.

mental] support provided for traditionally black colleges" (Executive Office of the President 1982, p. 5-115). This is one bright spot in an otherwise somber budget document, as it represents new funds for a program oriented toward minorities, one that has long symbolic links to the minority community.

The administration also has initiated other policy changes that are likely to affect participation by minorities. Major changes in various regulatory activities seem certain to reduce governmental support for affirmative action and equal opportunity programs.

Conclusion

The great social policy initiatives of the past two decades were based on the premise that many problems affecting minority students (and minority institutions) were the result of inadequate financial resources. Consequently, new and/or supplemental resources would overcome the financial and nonfinancial barriers to minorities' access to and participation in higher education and would yield better educational outcomes and institutional practices. Nearly two decades later it is clear that many of these programs have contributed to improved access to and participation in higher education for minorities. It is also evident that many of these programs, while effective in some areas, have not been a panacea for all the problems affecting minorities' participation. Many initial hopes and expectations were unrealistic; many of the proposed remedies involved simplistic solutions to complex problems.

The constituency politics and incremental funding that led to expanded programs in the past will not yield new resources in the future. Granted, in the current fiscal and political climate, program evaluation can be a two-edged sword. Even under the best circumstances, program evaluation has political consequences. Yet evaluation does contribute to the development and improvement of programs. Objective evidence on the efficacy of programs may help protect the most effective programs during periods of austere budgets.

The challenges of the 1980s will be for state, federal, local, and institutional officials to cooperate in developing better programs that promote participation by minorities. Too often, federal programs seem to function in an institutional or state policy vacuum, unacknowledged or unsupported by state and institutional policy makers (and state or institutional funding). Greater cooperation and better planning among federal agencies, state officials, and institutional representatives could do much to integrate activities involving minority outreach and support into the mainstream of academic institutions and move the nation toward fuller participation by minorities in American higher education.

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